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Youth bulges, poor institutional quality and missing migration opportunities - 
triggers of and potential counter-measures for terrorism in MENA 
Rahel Schomaker* 
 
 
Abstract: 
During the last few decades, a convolute of economic literature has emerged which focuses 
on the effects of demography, in particular the existence of so-called “youth bulges”, on 
economic growth and performance (for an overview see e.g. Bloom et al. 2001). The 
approach in our paper extends previous research to include potentially negative growth 
effects of a large share of young people in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) not only 
via the “channel” of unemployment, but also through their potential as a “trigger” for 
political unrest and domestic terrorism, which have been identified in economic literature as 
important obstacles to economic growth. These phenomena are most pressing in the labor-
rich countries of the region, which are often perceived as being exceptionally “terrorism-
prone” and which have experienced a significant share of the region’s (and the world’s) 
terrorist attacks over the last decade.  
In our paper, we will identify, theoretically and empirically, to what extent demographic 
factors, amongst others, matter when it comes to domestic terrorism. We will also provide 
some insights as to how these problems are caused, or at least substantially compounded 
by, the region’s specific traits, such as the poor institutional framework and the lack of 
migration opportunities. After a theoretical outline of the negative relationship between 
“youth bulges” and economic development, and an outline of the role of migration as an 
“exit-option” in this context, we provide empirical evidence for our hypothesis that 
institutional quality, the absence of “youth bulges” and the existence of migration 
opportunities is of pivotal importance in avoiding terrorist attacks. As some of these factors 
– namely institutional quality and migration policies – are amendable to change through 
policy measures, we close our paper with policy recommendations for measures to be taken 
within the ongoing transformation process in the region. 
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Introduction: The Youth Bulge Theory and its Operationalizations 
The idea that a large proportion of young people in a society may be a cause violent 
conflicts is not new; several researchers already examined the question of how and to what 
extent the two phenomena may be linked (e.g. for early works Choucri 1974). However, the 
scientific discussion about this link, as well as the popular debate on this topic, only started 
in the 1990s. In 1995, the term youth bulge itself was coined by Fuller (1995) in his seminal 
paper on “The Demographic backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic Overview”, which he 
presented at a CIA conference.  
The term “youth bulge” is used to define a situation in which the population share of the 
15-24 year-olds exceeds 20 per cent and the share of the 0-14 year-olds (often also referred 
to as the "children bulge" and a good predictor of future youth bulges) is higher than 30 per 
cent. The corresponding youth bulge theory predicts that societies characterized by a youth 
bulge while simultaneously facing limited resources and, in particular, a lack of prestigious 
positions for "surplus“ youngsters – i.e. the third, fourth, fifth etc. born children – are much 
more prone to social unrest and/or acting belligerent towards their neighbors than those 
societies without this demographic stressors. 
While the idea is not entirely new – similar theories were proposed earlier by, amongst 
others, Moller (1968) and Bouthoul (1970), youth bulge theories have more recently become 
very influential in shaping U.S. foreign policy, with political scientists such as Fuller and 
Goldstone, another contemporary proponent, serving as contracted advisors to several 
branches of the U.S. Government, including the CIA. The application of youth bulge theories 
has been particularly common with regard to the Muslim world, which in part is indeed 
witnessing historically unprecedented youth bulges  
Moreover, Huntington (1996) "endorsed" Fuller's theory in one of the final chapters of his 
extremely influential book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order”. 
In Germany and Continental Europe, youth bulge theories were largely ignored in academia 
and politics until Heinsohn's (2003) publication “Sons and World Power: Terror in the Rise 
and Fall of Nations.” 
In contrast to most other youth bulge theories, Heinsohn's approach (which adopts 
Goldstone's (1991) notion of "young men desperate for positions" argues that it is an excess 
of young adult males within any given youth bulge which helps to explain most (though not 
nearly all) periods of internal and "exported" social unrest in human history, i.e. civil war, 
terrorism, imperialism (colonization) and genocide. Essentially, Heinsohn defines a youth 
bulge as when the ratio of adequate (i.e. prestigious and/or well-paid) positions (in 
companies or the public sector) to the amount of such positions demanded by succeeding 
sons is substantially smaller than 1.  
He goes on to predict that these "surplus sons" are susceptible to all forms of “just” 
violence, which can result from indoctrination by political and various sorts of religious (i.e. 
not only Islamic) extremists. However, according to Heinsohn, widespread hunger and 
malnutrition, or epidemics such as AIDS, defuse the potential for violence inherent in youth 
bulges in large parts of Sub-Sahara Africa. 
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It is, therefore, important to point out that Heinsohn cautions against any mono-causal 
explanation of any sort of major social unrests through resort to youth bulges alone. In fact, 
he argues that some of history's most outrageous atrocities – e.g. Stalin's launch of a 
command and control economy in the Soviet Union, resulting in the mass deaths of 30 to 60 
million people, and the holocaust in Hitler's Germany after the beginning of World War II in 
1939 – cannot be explained as the results of youth bulges (though Russia displayed a 
massive youth bulge from 1897 to the years immediately before these young Bolsheviki 
staged the 1917 October Revolution; Germany's last youth bulge – with a 35 per cent 
population share – was recorded between 1919 and 1933, and gave a big boost to the 
National-Socialist movement’s drive to power in 1933, but after 1939 most German soldiers 
were from families with less than two sons).   
However, Heinsohn's main point is that youth bulges were at least an important 
contributing (or even enabling) factor in most outbreaks of social unrest, regardless of type. 
To empirically prove his hypothesis, he provides a lists of the world's largest countries (in 
2003), ranked according to the absolute number of children under the age of 15. The top ten 
countries, in rank order, are India, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, USA, Nigeria, Brazil, 
Bangladesh, Mexico and Ethiopia. Seven of the top ten countries display a population share 
of more than thirty per cent for the 0-15 year-olds, with Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan 
having the largest ratios (47 percent, 44 percent, and 40 percent, respectively). In contrast, 
Brazil, China and the USA are not characterized by a youth bulge (at 28 percent, 24 percent, 
and 21 percent, respectively). Finally he shows that of the 67 countries in his list which were 
affected by a youth bulge at some period(s) of time after 1945, 60 suffered from massive 
bouts of social unrest, with all major religions (except for Buddhism) and political ideologies 
having been involved. 
The idea that an exceptionally large share of young people or a large youth cohort size 
will lead to social unrest can be based on several transmission channels. One of the most 
prominent approaches, focusing the “supply side,” is based on the assumption that this 
phenomenon increases the “supply of cheap rebel labor” (Urdal, 2006). Limited employment 
opportunities – caused by the limited absorption capacity of the labor market in the face of a 
sudden surplus of labor – or decreasing relative (male) wages can result if more potential 
workers compete for only a few jobs (Easterlin, 1987; Niang, 2010). Dissatisfaction and 
frustration (and the related consequences) among young people are likely to be the 
consequence, in particular if – compared to their parents’ smaller generation –potential 
lifetime income is perceived to be limited. In addition, these arguments are backed by 
several studies in economic demography which suggest that the alternative costs of 
individuals who are a part of an existing youth bulge are lower in terms of “economic and 
social fortunes” (Urdal, 2006), compared to members of smaller cohorts. 
Furthermore, younger cohorts “tend to have lower opportunity costs relative to older 
cohorts” (Niang, 2010). While this effect might be inverted by increasing levels of education 
and a resulting rise in incomes, there is some evidence that it holds at least in the short run. 
Following Huntington (1996), it can be argued that “young people are the protagonists of 
protests, instability, reform, and revolution” as they may have – due to their age and their 
specific circumstances of living – a natural need to change their current situation. They may 
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be more likely to be attracted by new ideas due to their idealism or naivety, and more willing 
to question those authorities they are not (yet) a part of (Urdal, 2006). In addition, as young 
people in most cases do not have responsibilities for their own families, they may have more 
time to engage in such – risky – activities (e.g. Goldstone, 1991). 
The theory outlined above can be extended to include another form of violence, namely 
terrorism. The motivation to commit a terrorist attack, as with other forms of political 
violence, can be economic (poverty, unemployment, or the depression or stagnation of real 
wages), political (repression), or more social (lack of opportunities). Terrorism in these cases 
can be based on the “opportunity” of recruitment in youth bulges. Therefore the link from 
youth bulges to terrorism fits very well into the existing literature (Urdal, 2006). 
The existing literature suggests several ways to operationalize “youth bulges”, though 
these might be, as Urdal (2006) highlights, misleading in some cases. The most commonly 
used operationalization method, the use of the percentage of the total population under 15 
years or between 15 and 24 years as a predictor for a “youth bulge” might lead to flawed 
findings. Therefore, the use of an indicator which shows the size of the youth cohort relative 
to the adult population (defined as population over the age of 15) is often seen as more 
appropriate, especially if one assumes that violence and social unrest comes from 
competition between younger and older cohorts in a society (Niang, 2010). As outlined 
above, much of the theoretical foundation of the “youth bulge” theory is based on the 
assumption that competition (or, more specifically, the quest of younger generations for the 
achievements of the older ones), or the fact that “youth cohorts run into institutional 
‘bottlenecks’ because they are more numerous than previous cohorts” (Urdal, 2006), is the 
main cause of conflict. Following this argument, the relative share of youth to adult 
population could be the more appropriate indicator, as it models this competition.  
However, the youth of today compete not only with today’s adult population, but also 
with the following generation (today’s children). As only a few years may remain until the 
next, maybe larger generation enters the labor market, further reducing job opportunities 
and increasing rivalry for political influence, there is high competitive pressure for today’s 
youth, as they may have only a narrow time slot in which to receive their goals. Therefore, 
time-consuming reform processes may not be the optimal choice, as the potential results of 
these reforms will mainly benefit the next generation; thus violent behavior can be 
expected. Therefore, in our study, we follow the “traditional” definition of “youth bulges,” a 
share of young people relative to total population which exceeds a critical level of 20 per 
cent. We use not only a share as percentage, but a dummy variable which indicates the 
existence of a “youth bulge”. 
The Root Causes of Terrorism – What do we know so far? 
Several root causes, or at least “triggers”, of terrorism have been theoretically identified 
and/or empirically tested, including micro-level explanations like the social situation or 
psychological disposition of an individual as well as macro-level explanations like poor 
institutional quality in a country, social segregation, or poverty (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Krueger and Laitin, 2007; Niang, 2010). Furthermore, some “opportunity approaches”, based 
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on economic theory, help to explain terrorism using given framework conditions for 
recruiting followers or the payoffs of membership in terrorist groups (Niang, 2010). A large 
and growing body of literature on this topic demonstrates the increasing importance of 
research on terrorism and the high demand for policy-advice on counter-terrorism strategies 
(e.g. Abadie, 2004; Collier et al., 2003; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Li and Schaub, 2004; 
Sayre 2009). A few factors have been identified as being of specific importance, inter alia:  
 (relative) economic deprivation and poverty;  
 the political or institutional environment of a country;  
 political transformation processes and instability; 
 identity issues and civilizational clashes;  
 geographic characteristics; 
 contagion effects (country to country). 
The outcomes, especially of empirical studies, are not completely consistent, as studies 
with different designs and/or data sets have yielded different outcomes. In particular, the 
economic motivation for terrorism has been under theoretical and empirical review for a 
long time, with special attention to international terrorism. On a macro-level, most studies 
show only a slight correlation between economic conditions, or poverty, and the number of 
terrorist incidents in a country. On the micro-level, direct links between education levels, 
incomes, and the individual likelihood of engaging in terrorism could not be established (e.g. 
Abadie, 2004; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Krueger and Laitin, 2007). These findings are 
counter-intuitive, as the opportunity costs of terrorism in these cases are lower (compared 
to the “average”, ordinary citizen), but are backed by a large number of other studies (e.g. 
Piazza, 2008). 
There is some evidence that the political and institutional environment of a country is of 
importance. In particular, levels of political freedom seem to explain terrorism, as “countries 
in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism 
than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian 
regimes” (Abadie, 2004). This “inverted-U-shape-relationship” between terrorism or social 
unrest and democracy has been acknowledged by several scholars (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Urdal, 2006), but might not be beyond dispute given the data and methodology used 
(see for details Niang, 2010). 
Furthermore, some studies single out geographic or cultural factors to explain terrorism, 
but the range and explanatory power of this research remains limited. This is even more true 
regarding countries which have a Muslim majority, as Islam is often claimed to be more 
conducive to terrorism than other religions (for an overview of the reasoning see Fish, 2011). 
Thus, with regard to our research interest in the MENA region, we will include the specific 
research question of whether the Muslim countries are particularly prone to domestic 
terrorism. In addition, the outlined role of the share of young people in a society will be 
addressed, as in the last decade there “has been increasing popular attention on youth 
bulges as a possible explanation for terrorism and increased global insecurity” (Urdal, 2004). 
Violence and social unrest in general have a negative impact on the affected society, as 
they harm economic growth and development and result in the destruction of human and 
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physical capital, as well as a decrease in international trade and foreign direct investment 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). This link between sound economic performance and the 
absence of violence and unrest, having been confirmed by many empirical studies, gives rise 
to the highly plausible starting hypothesis that – beyond other violent actions – domestic 
terrorism, too, may cause equivalent negative effects. The economic side-effects of 
terrorism – the destruction of human capital, the creation of a feeling of insecurity and fear 
amongst the population and rising uncertainty also for foreign investors – are almost the 
same as those from social unrest, violence and civil wars. 
Terrorism is not an entirely new phenomenon, but is of increasing importance for 
societies and governments because of its immediate and, more importantly, indirect political 
and economic costs, which may be substantial. As previous studies have shown, terrorism 
reduces governmental stability (Gassebner et al., 2008); often hampers tourism, trade and 
capital flows to a country (in particular, FDI; Frey et al., 2007); may lead to rising 
unemployment rates (Benmelech et al., 2010); and will probably inhibit economic 
development in general (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Mirza and Verdier, 2008). 
Furthermore, on a societal level, terrorism may lead to a decrease in life satisfaction for 
citizens, as it is a cause of anxiety and uncertainty (Frey et al. 2007). In the long run, these 
consequences may lead to a vicious circle, as the very disillusionment terrorism causes may 
trigger a new wave of terrorism. 
Therefore, the discovery of the root causes of terrorism, as well as the formulation of 
sound policy advice to substantially reduce the incidence of further terrorist attacks, is 
pivotal to reducing its negative economic impacts (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2009). In this 
context, a growing body of literature is addressing the question of to what extent the 
specific characteristics of a country or society foster terrorism. In this ongoing 
interdisciplinary debate, both economic and political factors have been examined as well as 
institutional characteristics and cultural factors.  
In the relevant literature, several definitions of terrorism are used, depending on the 
professional research orientation. In our study, terrorism is defined in a broad sense as an 
alternative strategy of individuals or groups “to achieve a political outcome and not simply 
to inflict pain and destruction on civilian populations” (Niang, 2010). It is important to 
emphasize that terrorism is targeting a goal, which in most cases might be political (like 
regime change or secession) but can also be more economic in nature. This quest to reach a 
specified goal, mostly based on specific ideological or religious ideas, drives the single 
terrorist act, even if the “signaling effect” of terrorism should not be underestimated and is 
an important part of the overall strategy of terrorists and terrorist groups. Terrorism, 
therefore, in our study is defined “by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the 
perpetrators or the nature of the cause” (RAND, 2011). Thus our study’s chosen definition 
does not distinguish between the different causes (political, economic, religious/ideological), 
but focus on the act itself. This approach follows the definition of the RAND Database of 
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), which provides a dataset of terrorism stretching 
across the last 40 years and is widely used for comprehensive information on international 
and domestic terrorism. The following characteristics define a terrorist attack in the sense 
used in our study as outcome variable (RAND, 2011): 
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 Violence or the threat of violence; 
 calculated to create fear and alarm; 
 intended to coerce certain actions;  
 motive must include at least one more political objective; 
 generally directed against civilian targets; 
 can be executed by a group or an individual 
 
This definition is suitable as it covers almost all kinds of terrorist attacks carried out within 
the last decades, including the relatively new phenomenon of Islamist terrorism, in particular 
in its international or transnational dimension. As all characteristics outlined above can be 
applied to Islamist terrorism, and given the specific relevance of this kind of terrorism for the 
Middle East and North Africa, we base our study on the RAND-characteristics. 
Demography, Terrorism and Economic Growth in MENA Countries 
This hypothesized link between youth bulges in the MENA region and terrorism is not 
new: As stated by Urdal (2004), “after September 11, 2001, youth bulges have become a 
popular explanation for current political instability in the Arab world and for recruitment to 
international terrorist networks.” The geographical concentration of terrorism, or at least of 
a specific type of it, is unquestionable; three countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Israel) 
experienced nearly half of all terrorist attacks carried out by Islamist terrorists1 worldwide.  
Overall, during the last decade, most high-casualty terrorist attacks worldwide have been 
conducted by Islamist groups, which thus account for a significant amount of terrorism 
worldwide (Fish, 2011). As a consequence much attention has been given to Islamist 
terrorism and groups like al-Qaeda, which are recognized as a real danger for Western 
countries as well (Niang, 2010). Yet this focus might be misplaced, as most terrorist attacks – 
whether motivated by Islamist, nationalist or another ideology – worldwide are still national 
or domestic terrorism. Empirical evidence shows that very few attacks by Islamist terrorists 
have occurred in the western hemisphere, but rather that most of these attacks (about 62 
percent) are carried out in Muslim countries (Fish, 2011).  
Furthermore, the motivation to become a part of an international terrorist group like al-
Qaeda might differ substantially from the motivations to become a member of a domestic 
terrorist group as outlined above, and the targeted recruitment group therefore might not 
be the same. However, when a large part of the population is of Muslim belief it might 
increase the risk of domestic terrorism, and even if homicide rates in general are lower 
                                                 
1
 The term “Islamist” in this context has to be used carefully, as specific ways of thinking, following an ideology, and 
group membership is not always easy to identify.  
We use the term for individuals or groups which claim themselves (or are identified so by others) “to act in the name of 
Islamic principles and the Muslim community” (Fish, 2011), but interpret the religion of Islam in a more political way. 
Furthermore, Islamist groups in many cases violate at least some genuine Islamic principles. This “violation” does not 
always mean that actions or behavior include physical violence; they can include social or psychological pressure on specific 
groups or individuals. The overall goal of these groups is to form a state which fits Islamic principles, based on a very 
orthodox interpretation of Islam in general and Islamic law specifically. Regardless, it is of pivotal importance to emphasize 
that while most terrorist groups formed out of people with Muslim belief are based on Islamist ideology, to no extent are all 
Islamists potential or real terrorists.  
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among Muslims, this might help to explain the terrorism situation in the Middle East and 
North Africa beyond the youth problem (Fish, 2011). In that context, it has to be said that 
the distribution of domestic terrorism among Muslim countries is very heterogeneous, as 
can be seen in figure 1: 
Figure 1: Average Number of Attacks in Muslim Countries 1990 – 2008 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Another point which might be of importance in this context is the fact, outlined in more 
detail above, that in many almost all Muslim countries, whether or not they are located in 
the Middle East and North Africa, political participation is low and democratic structures are 
weak, even if there is some significant variation (see in detail Fish, 2011; Noland and Pack, 
2007). For decades, political freedom, freedom of expression and so on (measured as “Voice 
and Accountability (VA)”) have not been adequately provided for in the Middle East and 
North Africa; likewise, political stability (measured as “Political Stability and the absence of 
Violence (PV)”) is low (Kaufmann et. al., 2008).2 The situation in other Muslim countries such 
as Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iran is comparable, as governance quality is poor there as well. 
This overall low “institutional quality” might be another trigger for terrorism in the region or 
Muslim countries worldwide, as there are believe to be links between democracy and social 
unrest and violence, as outlined above. Therefore, with the existing and predicted youth 
bulges in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in other Muslim countries worldwide, 
“pooled” with high unemployment rates and the lack of opportunities for democratic 
participation for a large part of the society, the hypothesis that Muslim countries are more 
prone to terrorist attacks seems to be plausible. 
                                                 
2
 As the current uprisings and revolution processes in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate, there is some 
dynamics which is likely to lead to sustainable changes in these indicators in the future.  
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Adjusting the “Youth Bulge” Theory  
For the study we enlarged Heinsohn’s approach from violence and social unrest to include 
terrorism. Beyond the their failure to include demographic factors as an explanation for 
terrorism, several studies on terrorism suffer from some (potential) shortcomings, which 
might not influence the outcomes of the respective studies, but seem to be important. One 
especially important point is that most studies focus on international terrorism, despite that 
it represents only a small fraction of overall terrorist activities (Abadie, 2004). Yet domestic 
terrorism counts for most of the worldwide attacks and, therefore, should be the focus of 
our attention.  
Additionally, if we take youth bulges into consideration, which are a national or regional 
phenomenon, it is much more appropriate to choose domestic terrorism as the outcome 
variable. In these cases of domestic terrorist attacks the executor comes from the respective 
country, his/her nationality is clear, so youth bulges can be an explanatory variable. We 
therefore focus on domestic terrorism only, with a domestic incident being any attack 
without the direct involvement of a foreign entity (individual, government, and so on; RAND, 
2011).  
Our approach focuses on the specific “transmission channels” through which this kind of 
violence can be explained. The implicit assumption of our overall model of terrorism and 
youth bulges is that large youth cohorts are likely to experience unemployment or 
decreasing real wages (caused by the increased labor supply) and experience rising 
grievances as a consequence, especially when the individual’s expectations are “raised 
through expansions in education” (Urdal, 2004). Furthermore, the opportunities for the 
individual to exert some influence on the political system and to become a part of the 
political elite are substantially lowered in large cohorts (Urdal, 2004). In this context the 
opportunity cost approach, as discussed above, as well as the “lifetime-income hypothesis” 
and other approaches are applied to explain why individuals decide to carry out terrorist 
attacks.  
Furthermore, as a strong collective identity could be a necessary precondition for 
individuals to organize in a group (as most terrorist attacks are planned and/or carried out in 
a group) and become violent, other factors which ease the formation of a collective identity 
may be of importance when it comes to terrorism (Urdal, 2006). The current so-called 
“Facebook revolutions” of the Middle East and North Africa are an example, with the 
internet facilitating the formation of a collective identity and therefore “triggering” the 
uprisings. While this aspect does merit more attention in future research, we do not focus 
on it in our study, as micro-data on the use of the internet and the occurrence of terrorism 
are not available.  
Extending the Scope of Our Approach – Terrorism and Migration as “Exit” and “Voice”  
As anecdotal evidence shows, not all countries facing youth bulges are exceptionally 
prone to domestic terrorism, so some adjustments may be necessary. A factor which might 
mitigate the violent potential of youth bulges is the option to migrate. Emigration in this 
context may help to diminish some of the negative effects of youth bulges and thereby 
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might reduce the risk of terrorism – terrorism being understood as the “voice option” and 
migration as the “exit option,” as introduced in Hirschman’s (1970) “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” 
(see e.g. Ware, 2005).  
A convolute of economic literature addresses the question of how individuals react to 
framework conditions which do not fit their individual utility function. One of the most 
popular approaches to explaining the different choices is the model of “exit and voice”: 
According to Hirschman (1970 and 1978), there are two general options for an individual to 
cope with their discontent with the government or the institution they belong to – they can 
either voice their complaints in order to change the system, or they can exit the system (if 
the exit costs are not prohibitive for personal, legal and/or economic reasons). This choice is 
a general one and may be made regardless of whether the “system” is a state or another 
institution.  
One key question in this context is: Under what conditions one option will prevail over 
the other option? What determines the individual’s choice? What will be the consequences 
for the whole system – does it react, and in which form, e.g. does the society take notice of 
exits by its members, and will the exit cause satisfaction or dissatisfaction for the group that 
remains (Hirschman, 1978)? In this scheme, exit and voice can be seen as two contrasting, 
but “not mutually exclusive categories” (Hirschman, 1970), as there may be other reaction 
options – such as, for example, doing nothing. 
The scheme outlined above can be applied not only to institutions in general, but also 
states and/or governments. It is, therefore, suitable for our analysis of situations in which 
individuals participate – violently – in the system or leave it. Following Hirschman, if the exit 
option exists – for consumers, but in an extended model also for citizens (meaning the 
voting population) as well – then free competition unfolds in the market. In our specific 
model extension, this would imply that a regime has to react to exit as well as to voice – e.g. 
by adjusting policies or modifying structures. In particular, problems occur when neither exit 
nor voice have the “usual attention-forcing effect because the loss of revenue *… is+ not a 
matter of the utmost gravity” (Hirschman, 1970).  
Our hypothesis that the existence of a migration opportunity can reduce domestic 
terrorism is based on Hirschman’s assumption that “the presence of the exit option can 
sharply reduce the probability that the voice option will be taken up widely and effectively. 
Exit was shown to drive out voice.” If we expand that idea to participation in a country’s 
political process inclusive also of terrorism against it or migration from it, we can – in general 
– assume that the option to leave the system via migration will be preferred over the option 
to stay in the system and become a terrorist. 
This assumption is even more plausible in those cases where participation is associated 
with high costs, as terrorism for the individual can result in punishment, social isolation, or 
death (suicide terrorism or due to counter-terrorism activities). Therefore, one factor which 
– according to theoretical findings as well as anecdotal empirical evidence – may reduce the 
conflict potential related to youth bulges might be the opportunity for migration.  
Migration in this context “works as a safety valve” (Urdal, 2006). If migration 
opportunities are “substantially restricted, developing countries that previously relied on 
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exporting surplus youth may experience increased pressures from youth bulges 
accompanied by a higher risk of political violence” (Urdal 2006). It can be hypothesized that 
whenever a significant part of the youth bulge can be “exported” to other countries, the risk 
of youth discontent, resulting in violence and terrorism, can be substantially reduced (Urdal. 
2006). The restriction itself – whether due to geography, legal restrictions, or prohibitively 
high costs of migration - can, therefore, be seen as a trigger for terrorism.3 This is likely to be 
true regardless of where these young people emigrate to – whether to more developed 
countries at the other end of the world or to neighboring states.  
This linkage between a lack of migration opportunities and an increase in domestic 
terrorism can be easily modeled in several ways. One “channel”, applicable to dictatorships 
or autocratic regimes, can be the frustration of the people. In non-democratic, autocratic 
regimes, the people do not have a regular option of elections; they cannot vote out the 
dictator, the leading political elite, or party, as elections do not take place or are subject to 
fraud and manipulation. In these cases the only option to change the political system and 
thereby the individual chances within this system is the violent one – be it through protests 
and revolution or terrorist attacks (Möller, 2011).  
Another “channel” is the individual income situation. The individual’s utility-level depends 
on the budget constraint, in which consumption depends on the individual income. Income 
can be generated in three general ways: The individual can work in the legal market (l) and 
earn a legal wage (w), can work in the terrorism market (t)4 and earn a terrorist wage (wt), or 
can migrate and work outside the country (f) and earn the external wage (wf). A laborer can 
also divide time and labor between the terrorist labor market and the legal market, but not 
combine migration with working in the “internal” market, whether as a terrorist or a “legal” 
laborer (Wall, 2006).5 The individual’s decision whether or not to supply his or her labor to a 
terrorist group is based on the question of whether there is really a choice between these 
options. Therefore, we can assume that the individual’s decision whether or not to supply 
their abilities in the sense of labor to a terrorist group is based upon the following 
constrained maximization problem whenever there is no chance to migrate and get income 
from this migration option (Wall, 2006). 
Max U = [βCp + α(tp)]⅟p 
l, t subject to C = wl + wtt, l+t=1  
C is consumption, t is the time devoted to terrorist activities, l is time devoted to legal 
work, w is the wage rate for legal work, wt is the wage provided by the terrorist organization, 
and β and α are weights reflecting the individual’s preferences for C and t (Wall, 2006).  
                                                 
3
 In the current literature, this possible link is almost completely ignored. If discussed, the inverse link is focused on: 
Is there a danger that terrorism will be “imported”, e.g. through individuals which are coming from countries perceived as 
terrorism-prone. 
4
  The implicit assumption here is that “terrorism” does not mean suicide terrorism, so that the wage can be earned 
not only in one period (the period which precedes the final attack), but in several periods. 
5
 In this section, we distinguish neither whether the migration is legal or illegal, nor whether the employment in the 
host country is legal or illegal. 
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The implicit assumption here is that there is no “natural born terrorist”, but that most 
people might be willing and able to become a terrorist under certain circumstances, e.g. 
specific events which influence the personal attitude towards violence, unemployment, 
poverty, or the lack of perspectives in general. Therefore we do not distinguish between 
“terrorist sympathizers” or “anti-terrorists,” but assume that each individual is a “waverer” 
(the individual has an α-value of zero) who decides for or against terrorism depending on the 
alternatives. In that sense each individual is a mercenary; their decision depends on the 
costs and the benefits of the chosen alternative. The costs are determined by potential 
sanctions imposed on specific behavior, and the probability of discovery the benefits depend 
on the respective incomes earned.  
For all cases where the migration opportunity exists, the function of the decision to 
become a terrorist can be modeled as:  
Y = f (CK, pCDis, eNT) 
With the costs of terrorism (CT), costs of migration (CM), the costs of being discovered 
(CDis), (punishment cost, e.g. time in prison), p likelihood that the terrorist is discovered by 
the state and no longer able to “work” in the terrorist market, and the expected value of the 
net benefit of terrorism (eNT). The decision to become a terrorist is a subjective one and 
depends on the personal expectation of the benefits from the action. Therefore, terrorism 
will be the choice only if: 
CT + pCDis ≤ eNT 
If this model holds – and migration matters – there would be several ways to decrease 
domestic terrorism: First, if migration is an option, or if decreased costs of migration may 
lead to an increased overall migration, then there is potential for reduced terrorist attacks. 
Such a cost reduction can be induced through changes in visa policies, a relaxation of border 
controls, or reducing the sanctions imposed on illegal migration. The problem in this context 
is, however, that migration policies are not under the full control of the domestic 
government, but also the subject of international agreements, so that an independent 
decision is likely to be impossible and, if made, will at least lead to disputes with neighboring 
countries. Second, an increased domestic wage level in the legal market might decrease the 
likelihood of individuals becoming terrorists. Thus overall economic growth, which is 
reflected in rising domestic real wages, can help to reduce the incidence of terrorist attacks 
in the long term. 
Application to MENA Countries  
In recent surveys, almost half of the Arab youth expressed a desire to emigrate resulting 
from concerns over job opportunities and education, in particular in the labor-rich countries 
such as Egypt (Urdal 2006; UNDP, 2002). This trend is reflected by current numbers and may 
become manifest in real migration rates in the future. Today, migration from the MENA 
region to other global regions on average exceeds migration to the MENA (Pew, 2011). 
Projections indicate that the MENA countries will - between 2010 and 2015 – lose an annual 
average of 66 people per 100,000 in the general population.  
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Figure 2: Migration in MENA – Middle East 
Source: Pew Research Center 2011  
Figure 3: Migration in MENA - North Africa 
Source: Pew Research Center 2011  
As can be seen from figures 2 and 3, there are relevant differences for the sub-regions 
and between single countries. The aforementioned trend of negative net migration is 
particularly relevant for the resource-poor, labor-abundant countries, with slight differences 
between the single countries, while the countries of the GCC gained population in the 1990s 
and early 2000s and are likely to continue to growth through migration (Pew, 2011). For the 
period from 2010 to 2030 the migration rates from the resource-poor countries are 
expected to decrease, but are still likely to stabilize at a high level. 
Model and Empirical Analysis 
Our first hypothesis is that the existence of a youth bulge in a given period of time has a 
significant influence on the number of attacks a state will experience within this period. 
Furthermore, in line with the considerations outlined above, we assume that the fact that a 
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country has a Muslim majority or at least a Muslim minority may result in a large number of 
domestic terrorist attacks. 
To test the role of an existing youth bulge and other factors empirically, we use simple 
negative Binomial log models, which are more appropriate compared to other models (e.g. 
the Poisson model) due to the existing “over-dispersion”6 in the data. The regression 
coefficients in this model can be interpreted as the rate of change between the independent 
variable and the log of expected counts of the dependent variable. These log odds are not as 
easy to interpret, so the relevant information in these models comes from the significance 
level of the variable and the direction of the sign (positive or negative effect on the 
dependent variable).  
Additionally, all models show an overall significance at the 1 percent level for the 
Omnibus-Test, indicating that the model used (with several explaining variables) is 
significantly better than an alternative model without these variables. Additionally, the 
values of AIC and BIC for the models used indicate a strong goodness of fit.7 
The basic model displayed below estimates the effect of a Dummy for an existing youth 
bulge; a Dummy for a country being a country with Muslim majority; as well as indicators for 
economic conditions, governance quality, and other factors on the number of attacks in a 
given period of time as the independent variable. 
 log (Number of Attacksi)= α + β1x1 + …+ βn xn + εi 
The number of attacks in a given period of time (five-year intervals: 1986-1990, 1991-
1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005) in a country is the dependent variable. From our point of view, 
the decision  of when to become a terrorist and when to execute an attack is incidental to a 
certain degree – if one becomes a terrorist on the 31st of December or on January 1st may be 
the consequence of random effects. Furthermore, some time is required before the decision 
to become a terrorist translates into an attack itself. The period of radicalization may take 
some time, so that annual data, which is used in most studies on that topic, may not be 
suitable. We try to bypass this problem by using a five-year period for the number of attacks 
as well as five-year averages for some of the influencing factors.  
We use the existence of a so-called children bulge (population aged 0 to 14 years exceeds 
30 per cent) in a country as a predictor of and therefore an appropriate dummy for further 
youth bulges, by lagging it for five years. Using the children bulge is necessary due to a lack 
of data for the 14 to 24 year old demographic, but the choice seems methodically 
appropriate – and given that we used averages for a five-year period each it is unlikely that 
the young population is reduced substantially due to migration or death, which would mean 
that the children do not reach the status of youth five years later. Only in the unlikely case 
that the following generation is so large that the forerunning average children bulge never 
becomes a youth bulge would this approach would be misleading. Given the decreasing birth 
                                                 
6
 Overdispersion in this context means that the variance in the data is higher than the expected variance from the 
model. Therefore e.g. a Poisson model, which implies the equality of mean and variance, cannot be used in the case of 
over-dispersion, but a negative binomial distribution is suitable (Gschlößl and Czado, 2006). 
7
 As compared to other models tested (different variables, limited data set) and not used in this study. 
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rates over the last 50 years worldwide, this does not seem to be a problem which occurs 
very often and can therefore be ignored in our study. With our design we can capture the 
large group of young persons (under 20 years old), which is, according to the related 
literature, accountable for a large share of violence and therefore seems to be relevant to 
our study (Niang, 2010). 
As independent variables/predictors, we used indicators for economic growth and 
political stability (averages for five-year periods each) and included several Dummies: 
 Average GDP per capita, lagged by 5 years 
 Average GDP growth 
 Average political stability (Polity 2) 
 Dummy variable for “Muslim Majority” 
 Dummy variable for “Muslim Minority (larger than 5 per cent of population)” 
 Dummy variable for “Youth Bulge” (population aged 0 to 14 years exceeds 30 per 
cent), lagged by 5 years 
 Dummy “State Failure Problems” 
As mentioned above, the topical literature suggests a broad variety of factors which can 
contribute to explaining the incidence of (domestic) terrorism. As previous studies used 
annual data, we tested for the average GDP per capita for a five-year period, lagged by five 
years, as well as the average GDP growth in a five-year period. Despite that several studies 
came to the conclusion that economic conditions may not be so important, there are, 
theoretically, some indications that economic conditions might matter. On the one hand, 
wealthy countries can redistribute resources better in order to smooth out dissatisfaction 
(Henderson and Singer 2000). On the other hand, raising incomes increase the opportunity 
costs of potential terrorists, as their possible earnings in the regular economy will likely 
become higher in the future (de Soysa, 2002; see for details Urdal, 2004).  
Economic well-being is estimated as the average GDP per capita over the five-year period 
before the period of observation. The data for average GDP per capita as well as for the 
average GDP growth comes from the World Bank “World Development Indicators”; 
population data is collected from this source, too. Data for average political stability and for 
the construction of the Dummy for “State Failure Problems” (Polity 2) is collected from a 
modification of the Polity IV project by Marshall and Jaggers (2000), with values ranging 
from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). Dummy variables for Muslim majority as 
well as for Muslim minority (larger than 5 per cent of the population) are constructed with 
data from the World Bank.  
In addition, several indicators and Dummy variables are used to test the effects of the 
“exit-effect” of migration, or of a lack of migration opportunities on domestic terrorism: we 
included a Dummy to indicate the general openness of a country for labor migration; the 
Dummy “Migrant Worker Convention” indicates if a country has signed this international 
convention to protect migrant worker’s rights and to ease their work conditions. This 
dummy does not capture whether outward (labor) migration is possible or easy for a specific 
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case, but has been included to test if a country is generally open to inward labor migration. 
The implicit assumption is that a country which signed the convention and which therefore 
has to fulfill specific obligations towards its inward migrants is more likely to view migration 
and migrants as important and positive and that it will thus not actively hamper the outward 
migration of its own people. 
The Dummy “Missing Migration Opportunity” indicates whether or not there is an easy 
migration opportunity for the population of a specific country. This Dummy takes the value 1 
if there is no legal migration opportunity, or if this opportunity is correlated to prohibitively 
high costs, and the value 0 if a – legal and easy – migration opportunity exists. So, for 
example, if a country became a member of the Commonwealth of Nations8 before the year 
1971, or is still linked closely to Great Britain, then its citizens fall under specific permissive 
regulations regarding living and working – the right to abode – in Great Britain. For countries 
who meet these requirements the Dummy becomes 0. Furthermore, if a country has signed 
a bi- or multilateral agreement on labor migration with one or more foreign countries, e.g., 
allowing the domestic population to work elsewhere, the Dummy is classified as being 0. 
Additionally, this Dummy captures the effect of a country having an active anti-migration 
policy, e.g. in the form of migration restrictions such as requirements for an exit visa to leave 
the county. 
To capture effects which amplify each other, or only occur if other conditions are fulfilled 
simultaneously, interaction terms are inserted in the regression model. In line with the 
theoretical considerations, of particular importance is the interaction of the restriction of 
“voice” and “exit” at the same time, and the existence of a “youth bulge” and a “Muslim 
majority.” The results of several regression models used (samples for world and Muslim 
countries only) are displayed in tables 1 and 2. 
                                                 
8
  The Commonwealth of Nations is a political association of independent states, most of them being former 
colonies of Great Britain. As a consequence, in British immigration law a number of specific regulations existed or still exists 
which guarantee citizens of Commonwealth members specific rights to live and work in Great Britain or apply for British 
citizenship, easing emigration from their home-countries for those groups of people. 
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Table 1: Model Outcomes - Youth Bulge, Terrorism, and Migration 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
Parameter i ii iii° 
Exp(B) 
Intercept 55,259* 55,48* 36,460* 
Average Polity2 1,079* 1,079* 1,080* 
Average GDP per capita growth annual 1,095* 1,095* 1,076* 
Average GDP per capita (const 2000 $; 5 year lag)   1,000*** 
Dummy State Failure Problem Set=0 ,172* ,173* ,080* 
Dummy Missing Migration Opportunity=0 3,804* 3,805*  
Interaction Muslim Youth Bulge=0 ,330*** ,330***  
Dummy Youth Bulge 5year lag=0 1,143 1,142  
Dummy Youth Bulge10year lag=0   1,278 
Dummy Muslim Minority 5% or higher=0   2,697* 
Dummy Muslim Majority=0 2,994*** 2,995*** ,716* 
Dummy Migrant Worker Convention=0   ,843 
Interaction Youth Bulge Missing Migration=0 ,182* ,183*  
Interaction State Failure Youth Bulge Missing 
Migration=0 
1,014 .  
Number of Observations: 357 (i, ii)/°265 (iii) 
*Indicates significance at the 1 per cent level, ***  10 per cent level 
Negative Binomial Regression 
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Table 2: Model Outcomes - Youth Bulge, Terrorism, and Migration in Muslim Countries 
Parameter Exp(B) 
Intercept 509,903* 
AveragePolity2 1,127* 
Average GDP per capita growth annual 1,070 
DummyStateFailureProblemSet=0 ,698 
DummyMissingMigrationOpportunity=0 ,677 
InteractionMuslimYouthBulge=0 ,330*** 
DummyYouthBulge5year lag=0 ,140* 
InteractionStateFailureYouthBulgeMissingMigration=0 ,346 
Number of Observations: 75 (Muslim countries only) 
* Indicates significance at the 1 per cent level, *** 10 per cent level 
Negative Binomial Regression 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
We found that, in line with the existing literature, a number of independent variables 
have a significant influence on the number of terrorist attacks in a given period of time: we 
found statistically significant evidence that Muslim countries experience, on average, more 
domestic terrorism, a fact which implies some lessons for the MENA countries, in particular 
when linked to other results of our empirical studies. While the average GDP has no 
influence on the number of attacks, average GDP growth has a positive and statistically 
significant influence on the incidence of terrorism. These (counterintuitive) results underpin 
previous studies (e.g. Krueger and Maleckova, 2003). 
As we found no general empirical evidence that there is a significant difference between 
the number of attacks in countries which are experiencing a youth bulge and countries with 
other demographic developments, the fact that most MENA countries, in particular the 
labor-rich ones, have large youth cohorts does not alone make them especially vulnerable to 
domestic terrorism. As expected from the “New Institutional Economics” (NIE), the quality of 
institutions matter when it comes to terrorism, as the number of attacks is likely to increase 
by a significant multiple when the institutional quality is exceptionally low, i.e. when state-
failure is manifest (Dummy). Additionally, and seemingly counter-intuitive at the first sight, 
for each point increase in overall institutional quality, indicated by the average “Polity2” 
score, the number of attacks increases slightly, but at a statistically significant level. This 
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outcome suggests an inverted “U-shape” for this relationship, with attacks being high in a 
condition of state failure and when the institutional quality is exceptionally high, in free 
political systems as democracies – the chances to create a terrorist group or to carry out an 
attack may be higher in democracies due to a lower level of state control and less 
suppression (see for effects of political freedom on terrorism e.g. Abadie, 2004 and 2006; 
Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2009). Additionally, missing migration opportunities in 
combination with the existence of a youth bulge have a statistically significant effect on the 
number of attacks in a country  
Furthermore, there is another factor which is of particular relevance for the labor-rich 
and relatively less developed countries in MENA: As our empirical findings demonstrate, the 
lack of easy migration opportunity, e.g. due to prohibitively high migration costs or a lack of 
– legal and/or illegal – migration options, does not increase the incident rate of terrorism in 
general (compared to the reference group), but it does increase terrorism incidences for 
countries with a Muslim majority (figure 4). 
Figure 4: Links between Migration and Terrorism in the Muslim World 
Source: Author’s calculation 
While a statistically significant increase of domestic terrorism (interaction term) cannot 
be observed for countries worldwide which experience all factors at the same time – missing 
migration opportunities, state failure and a youth bulge -, for the Muslim countries there is a 
significant impact; the number of attacks increases when all these factors are in place (figure 
5).  
Figure 5: Links between Migration, Youth Bulges, and Terrorism in the Muslim World 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
Given that for most MENA countries, in particular all labor-rich MENA countries, all three 
factors are indeed present, a high vulnerability to domestic terrorism pre-exists. With regard 
to the negative impact of terrorism on the economy and the society of the affected country, 
as discussed above, effective counter-terrorism policies may thus be necessary for better 
economic performance. So, regarding the policy options available to these countries, what 
can be done to reduce those obstacles for further growth? Regarding youth bulges, no short-
term policy option exists – but one may not be necessary, as the long-term birth rates are 
decreasing anyway, meaning that these youth bulges are likely to disappear within the next 
30 years in most countries. Therefore, reforming the institutional framework, improving the 
poor institutional quality, and generating migration opportunities, e.g. through bi- or 
multilateral labor-migration agreements, are the only short-term options available to the 
governments of the affected countries themselves, but also in their interaction with regional 
and international partners. To reach these results, far-reaching reforms and transformations 
in the affected MENA countries seem to be necessary preconditions – transitions processes 
which are currently unfolding in the so-called “Arab Spring”… 
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